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SDT models the relationship between signals and noise, as well as the 1 automation's ability to detect signals among noise. The state of the world is 2 characterized by either "signal present" or "signal absent", which may or may not be 3 identified correctly by the automation. The combination of the state of the world and 4 the automation's detection results in four possible states: hit, miss, false alarm (FA) 5 and correct rejection (CR). 200 trials, half of the participants were provided with the reliability of the decision aid 1 (total number of errors) and the other half not. The participants then rated the decision 2 aid's performance and indicated whether to rely on the aid for the target detection task 3 in 10 trials randomly chosen from the past 200 trials. Results showed that both types of 4 decision aids were rated more favorably when its reliability was disclosed. More four unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that utilized automated target recognition (ATR) 7 systems to identify targets as enemy or friendly. Results showed that when participants 8 were informed of the overall success likelihood information ("corrected identification 9 rate" in the article), participants tended to apply a more appropriate strategy when 10 interacting with the automation, resulting in better task performance.
11
The second type of likelihood information is the predictive value, calculated as dependence using a combat identification (CID) task. In the study, participants 18 distinguished friend from foe with the aid from an imperfect CID. More specifically, due 19 to its working mechanism, once the CID identified a soldier as friendly, it was always 20 correct. However, when the CID identified a soldier as "unknown", the solider could be 21 "friendly", "hostile" or "neutral". Half of the participants were informed of the positive 22 predictive value and the other half not. Results of their study revealed that disclosing 23 the positive predictive value to users positively influenced trust and reliance. In a follow 24 up study, Neyedli, Hollands, and Jamieson (2011) developed four visual displays for 25 presenting predictive values in the CID task. Display type (pie, random mesh) and 26 display proximity (integrated, separated) of likelihood information were manipulated in 27 the experiment. The results revealed that participants relied on the automation more 28 appropriately and had greater sensitivity with the integrated display and random mesh 29 6 display. Studies on likelihood alarms also shed light on the effects of disclosing the 1 predictive values. Likelihood alarms, in contrary to traditional binary alarms, integrate 2 both state information and likelihood information by dividing a state into two or more 3 graded levels. For instance, "warning" and "caution" could both indicate the presence of 4 a target, with "warning" indicating a higher probability. Although not explicitly stated, 5 these studies manipulated the positive and negative predictive values to represent the 6 varying likelihood of true positives and true negatives given the automation responses, decide whether a target was present or not. However, the display of rings indicating the 12 likelihood that a target was present, given a return signal, did not seem to improve the 13 overall ability of participants to distinguish targets from noise.
14
The third type of likelihood information is the hit rate and correct rejection rate, "Slightly above 50%" for low hit rate) was disclosed to the participants. Comparing to a 2 previous study where participants were unaware of the likelihood information, there 3 seemed to be no evidence on any beneficial effects of disclosing hit rate on trust in 4 automation or task performance. The above-mentioned studies on likelihood information suggest that disclosing the 7 overall likelihood information could increase preference and task performance. In 8 addition, in general there is positive evidence supporting that presenting predictive 9 values could help human operators calibrate their trust and adjust their dependence 10 behaviors, leading to better performance. In contrast, revealing hit/CR rates does not 11 seem to be beneficial. Despite the inconsistent results, there is little, if not no, research 12 directly comparing the effects of revealing different types of likelihood information.
13
In the present study, we aimed to investigate if and how different methods of 14 calculating likelihood information affect operators' trust in and dependence on 15 automation, and task performance. We argue that the beneficial effects of disclosing the 16 likelihood information are influenced by, at least, two factors. The first factor is 17 information granularity -the extent to which the likelihood information represents 18 probabilistic information specific to certain conditions. The overall success likelihood, 19 P r(Success | Automation response), is less fine-grained compared to the predictive 20 values and the hit/CR rates, as it represents an aggregated probability regardless what 21 the automation response is (alert or no alert). The second factor is information 22 directness -the extent to which the likelihood information can be directly used to guide 23 people's behaviors without the need to estimate or integrate other information. The In the example, the hit rate is 95%. However, it does not mean that when an 21 alarm goes off, there is 95% chance that there would be a threat. To answer the 22 question correctly, we need to apply the Bayes' rule to calculate the positive predictive 23 value, mathematically the inverse of the hit rate: Bayesian inference, we speculate that the hit/CR rates are the least direct. are correct. Despite the lack of granularity, we speculate that the overall likelihood 19 information is more direct than the hit/CR rate, as it can be easily used to guide 20 overall human behaviors.
21
Due to the influence of the two factors, we predicted that there would be 22 significant differences in participants' trust, dependence and dual-task performance 23 when presented with different types of likelihood information. In particular, disclosing 24 hit/CR rate would be the least beneficial in fostering proper trust and dependence, and 10 We used a simulated surveillance task in the experiment. In the experimental 11 task, participants were asked to control the level of flight of a simulated swarm of 12 drones, essentially a compensatory tracking task, and simultaneously detect potential 13 threats in photo feeds from the drones ( Figure 2) . Participants were only able to access 14 the display for either the tracking task or the detection task at any time and needed to 15 toggle between the two displays. The simulated surveillance task was programmed 16 using Java and the experiment was run on a 24 inch monitor.
Apparatus and stimuli

17
Tracking task. Each trial started on the tracking display and lasted 10 seconds.
18
The tracking task was programmed based on the PEBL (The Psychology Experiment
19
Building Language) compensatory tracker task 20 (http://pebl.sourceforge.net/battery.html). Participants used a joystick to move a 21 randomly-drifting green circle to a crosshair located at the center of the screen -i.e. 22 minimize the distance between the green circle and the crosshair as shown in Figure 2 and make his or her own decisions. If the detector identified no threat, the alert was 12 silent. Participants did not report the absence of threat, i.e., participants were expected 13 to perform no action when there was no threat. The performance of the detection task 14 is measured by detection time, detection accuracy and detection score (Please refer to 15 the Scoring System section).
16
Toggle between two displays. Every trial started on the tracking display.
17
Participants were only able to access one display at a time, and needed to toggle 18 between the displays of the tracking and the detection tasks using a "Switch" button on 19 the joystick. There was a 0.5-second time delay every time they toggled between the 20 displays, simulating the time for computer processing and loading the displays. The 21 time stamp and the number of occurrences of participants pressing the "Switch" button 22 were tracked automatically by the program.
23
Scoring system. In the experimental task, participants performed the tracking 24 task and the detection task simultaneously, and needed to make a trade-off decision on 25 which task to perform at any time, i.e. if they decide to check the four images, they 26 would probably earn more points in the detection task but fewer points in the tracking 27 task, and vice versa. Therefore, a pay-off structure has to be determined to eliminate 28 potential bias toward either the tracking or the detection task by ensuring that the 29 13 potential gain in one task is approximately equal to the opportunity cost in the other 1 task. A pilot study was conducted to determine the payoff structure (Please refer to 2 Appendix A for more details). As a result, every trial participants could obtain 0-10 3 points for the tracking task and 0-5 points for the detection task.
Detection is wrong The experiment adopted a 2 (automation reliability: low vs high) ×3 (likelihood 7 information: overall success likelihood, predictive values, and hit/CR rates) mixed 8 design with automation reliability as the within-subjects factor and likelihood 9 information as the between-subjects factor.
10
The reliability of the automated threat detector was configured based on SDT. In 11 the present study, the criterion c was set at -0.25 and sensitivity d' at 1.5 or 3, resulting 12 in automation with low and high reliability ( "I don't trust the detector at all" and the rightmost anchor "I absolutely trust the 9 detector". The visual analog scale was then converted to a 0-100 scale. As part of the 10 testbed design, in addition to trust ratings, participants needed to report their 11 self-confidence in performing the task without the decision aid and perceived reliability 12 of the decision aid. As the two measures were less relevant to this study, we did not 13 report the data analysis results. block of combined tasks, where participants experienced 2 hits, 2 misses, 2 false alarms 5 and 2 correct rejections. Participants were informed that the automated threat detector 6 used in the practice was just for illustration purpose. Afterward, they were randomly 7 assigned to one of the three likelihood information conditions. A table similar to Figure   8 1 was then shown to the participants. Based on the condition a participant was 9 assigned to, the definition, the meaning and the calculation of a particular likelihood 10 information were introduced to the participant. In order to ensure that participants 11 understood the likelihood information, the participants were given an example with 12 different number of hits, misses, FAs and CRs, and were asked to calculate the to the onset of each trial, there was a splash screen with a 3-second countdown timer.
21
After every trial, participants were informed of the detection accuracy, the tracking 22 score and the detection score they obtained in this trial and the accumulative scores 23 they had obtained so far. After every 5 trials, participants indicated their trust.
24
Participants were told that their subjective ratings should be based on all the trials 25 they have completed so far, instead of just the previous 5 trials. 
RESULTS
1
Data from one participant were excluded from analysis as his tracking task 2 performance was below three standard deviations from the mean. All hypotheses were 3 tested using data from the remaining 60 participants. We used mixed design analysis of Trust. Participants had higher trust in the automated threat detector as 10 automation reliability increased (F (1, 56) = 7.533, p = .008). However, the effect of 11 likelihood information was non-significant. Compliance. Higher automation reliability led to higher compliance rate on the predictive values led to higher reliance on the automated threat detector, compared to 7 the overall success likelihood condition (p = .009) and the hit/CR rates condition (p < 8 .001). There was also a significant two-way interaction between automation reliability 9 and likelihood information (F (2, 56) = 4.807, p = .012). When automation reliability 10 was low, participants relied on the automated threat detector the most when they were 11 informed of the predictive values (predictive values > overall success likelihood: p < 12 .001; predictive values > hit/CR rates: p < .001). As reliability increased, the reliance 13 rate was significantly higher when participants were provided with predictive values 14 relative to the hit/CR rates (p = .004). increased. However, the effect of likelihood information was not significant.
2 Figure 4 . Detection task performance
Tracking performance. As shown in Figure 5 , there were significant main 3 effects of automation reliability (F (1, 56) = 4.37, p = .041) and likelihood information 4 (F (2, 56) = 5.381, p = .007) on tracking score. Post hoc analysis indicated that when 5 participants were presented with hit/CR rates, they had the lowest tracking score 6 (hit/CR rates < predictive values: p = .038; hit/CR rates < overall success likelihood: 7 p = .011).
8
Additionally, there was a significant effect of likelihood information (F (2, 56) = 9 4.311, p = .018) on RMSE. When participants were presented with hit/CR rates, they 10 had the a higher RMSE (hit/CR rates > overall success likelihood: p = .019). The 11 main effect of automation reliability on RMSE was not significant.
12
Combined performance. The main effects of automation reliability (F (1, 56) 13 = 10.744, p = .002) and likelihood information (F (2, 56) = 6.293, p = .003) were 14 significant ( Figure 6 ). Participants obtained higher combined scores as automation 15 reliability increased. There was also a difference among the three types of likelihood 16 information. Post hoc analysis revealed that participants informed of overall success 17 likelihood or predictive values, instead of the hit/CR rates, had higher total scores 18 (overall success likelihood > hit/CR rates: p = .008; predictive values > hit/CR rates: 19 p = .014). In the present study, we predicted that there would be significant differences in 2 participants' trust, dependence and dual-task performance when presented with 3 different types of likelihood information. In particular, disclosing hit/CR rate would be 4 the least beneficial in fostering proper trust and compliance and reliance behaviors, and 5 would lead to the worst task performance. Revealing the predictive values, in contrast, 6 would be the most beneficial. We discuss how the results support our prediction.
7
Trust in automation 8 Our results indicate a non-significant difference on trust between the three types 9 of likelihood information. The lack of significance might have been due to two reasons. 
11
Compliance and Reliance behaviors 12 We found a significant difference in reliance and a non-significant difference in 13 compliance between the three types of likelihood information. Disclosing the predictive 14 values led to higher and more appropriate reliance, compared to the overall success 15 likelihood condition and the hit/CR rates condition. We argue that the predictive 16 values can be considered as the gold standard of optimal behaviors. The negative 17 predictive value, Pr(N o signal | N o alert) = x%, means that when the automation is 18 silent, there is x% chance that a site is clear. Therefore, probablistically speaking, if the 19 threat detector is silent for 100 cases, the human operator only need to check 100 − x 20 sites in person.
21
In our study, the negative predictive value was 97% for the high reliability 22 automation, and 92% for the low reliability automation. Therefore, a rational strategy 23 for the human operator is to cross-check only a small number of sites, and to allocate 24 more resource on the tracking task. When presented with negative predictive values, 25 participants' reliance rates were 90.8% and 83.8%, respectively (see Figure 3 and Table   26 2), which were fairly close to the optional values of 97% and 92%. When informed of 27 the overall likelihood, the observed reliance values were 79.7% and 46.5%, further away 28 21 from the optimal values; When presented with the hit/CR rates, the observed reliance 1 values were 59.8% and 37.7%, furthest away from the optimal values. In the present 2 study, the base rate was set to be 30%. In real life, bases rates of critical events are We failed to find a significance in participant's compliance behaviors. This lack of 8 significance might have resulted from participants' strategies between the detection and 9 the tracking tasks. The positive predictive values were 78% for the high reliability 10 automation and 54% for the low reliability automation. However, across all the 11 likelihood conditions, the compliance rates were considerably lower than the optimal 12 values (see Figure 3 and Table 2 ). This suggests that participants cross checked the 13 detection display much more frequently than they should have done. This is further 14 supported by our observation: participants mentioned that the tracking task was fairly 15 boring and they preferred to cross-checking the detection display even if the strategy 16 was not optimal. The unnecessary cross-checking behaviors allowed the participants to 17 detect threats that the automated detector failed to recognize and contributed to a 18 similar performance in the detection task.
19
Performance 20
Our results indicate a significant difference in tracking task and non-significant 21 difference in detection task. The tracking performances in the predictive value condition 22 and the overall likelihood condition were better than that in the hit/CR rate condition.
23
Such results are attributable to participants' reliance and compliance behaviors. When 24 presented with hit/CR rates, participants' reliance behaviors were the least optimal, 25 which means they cross-checked much more frequently than they should have done.
26
Every time a cross-checking was performed, participants could not access the tracking 27 display, hurting the tracking performance. In addition, as mentioned before, the similar 28 22 compliance behaviors resulted in the similar performance in the detection task. 1 The observed pattern on tracking and detection performance suggests that the 2 automated threat detector was largely used as a tool for attention management in 3 multitask environments, benefiting the continuous unaided task (i.e. the tracking task), 4 rather than a tool directly benefiting the aided task (i.e. the detection task). The result 5 support the findings of Wiczorek and Manzey (2014).
6
In addition, we also observed a difference in the combined task performance.
7
Disclosing predictive values and overall likelihood information led to higher combined 8 performance than the hit/CR rates condition. We note the importance of obtaining an 9 explicit pay-off structure with the same unit of measurement. Most of the prior 10 literature did not report the combined task performance, largely because different tasks 11 were measured in different units and a combined task performance score was impossible 12 to obtain.
13
At last, consistent with findings from previous studies, our results showed that as 14 the automated threat detector became more reliable, participants' trust in and 15 dependence on the threat detector increased, and their dual task performance improved. predictive values, and hit/CR rates.
26
The present study offered a framework to summarize existing literature pertaining 27 to disclosing likelihood information. Our results showed that not all likelihood 28 23 information is equally useful. Simply presenting the hit/CR rates should be avoided. 1 Our findings can be applied to a wide array of domains such as urban search and rescue 2 (USAR), medical diagnosis and TSA, where the hit/CR rates are often readily available 3 but not the predictive values and overall likelihood information. Hit/CR rates, also 4 known as sensitivity and specificity (Altman & Bland, 1994) , are referred to as the 5 diagnostic information (Please note that the sensitivity as hit rate is different from the 6 sensitivity d in SDT). Often, the diagnostic information is more accessible to people. the discrepancies between the predictive values and the hit/CR rates would be even 17 larger. Mis-attributing hit/CR rates as predictive values would lead to more 18 detrimental outcomes.
19
The findings should be viewed in light of the following limitations. First, 20 consistent with prior research, we did not provide participants with the base rate and 21 they had to estimate it by themselves. Future study can present base rate to 22 participants and examine whether people can utilize hit/CR rates more appropriately.
23
Base rate can also be manipulated in further research to examine the effects of 24 likelihood information when base rate is extremely low. Second, we used probabilities • We proposed a framework to summarize existing literature pertaining to 2 disclosing likelihood information and classified the calculation of likelihood 3 information into three categories: overall likelihood value, predictive values, and 4 hit and correct rejection (CR) rates.
5
• Human operators informed of the overall likelihood value or the predictive values, 6 rather than the hit and correct rejection (CR) rates, relied on the decision aid 7 more appropriately.
8
• Human operators informed of the overall likelihood value or the predictive values, 9 rather than the hit and correct rejection (CR) rates, performed better on the 10 tracking task and obtained higher combined task scores.
11
• As automation reliability increased, trust, compliance, reliance and performance 12 increased accordingly. 
